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INTRODUCTION
In 2002, the Federal Circuit delivered nine opinions addressing
1
substantive trademark issues.
The court also addressed, albeit
2
briefly, procedural issues in two cases. For the most part, the 2002
cases are unremarkable and present no grand departures from prior
precedent. Rather, the cases represent continued application and
modest refinement of prior Federal Circuit law.
The substantive issues addressed by the Federal Circuit in 2002
3
4
5
include the likelihood of confusion, functionality, priority of use,
6
and descriptiveness. The court considered two procedural issues;

1. See Thompson v. Haynes, 305 F.3d 1369, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (affirming the District Court’s finding of likelihood of confusion between
the marks at issue); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (“the Board”) erred in determining that Kappa’s prior use created
proprietary rights); Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Board erred by
concluding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue);
Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that Transclean failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the nondescriptive usage of its marks to prevent summary
judgment in its trademark infringement action); In re Galbreath, No. 01-1620, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 9702 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2002) (concluding that the trademark
application at issue was merely descriptive of a product, and therefore was properly
denied); PC Club v. Primex Techs., No. 01-1220, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4892 (Fed.
Cir. Mar. 22, 2002) (holding that the Board correctly concluded there was little
likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue); Royal Appliance Mfg. Co. v.
Minuteman Int’l, Inc., No. 01-1555, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4381 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 7,
2002) (affirming the Board’s decision to deny a trademark for domestic and
industrial vacuum cleaners based on likelihood of confusion); Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(reversing the Board’s decision that the marks at issue were not sufficiently related to
support a finding of likelihood of confusion); Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278
F.3d 1268, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that applicant’s
cross-sectional designs were de jure functional, and therefore not subject to
trademark protection).
2. See Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (remanding the case for a determination of the proper choice of law
with respect to the trademark infringement issues); Boyle v. Barclays Global
Investors, N.A., No. 02-1357, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24098 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2002)
(dismissing Boyle’s appeal from a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
as untimely).
3. See infra Part I.A (summarizing the five Federal Circuit cases delivered in 2002
that focused on the issue of likelihood of confusion).
4. See infra Part I.B (analyzing the 2002 Federal Circuit case that addressed the
trademarking of functional designs).
5. See infra Part I.C (detailing the 2002 Federal Circuit case that dealt with the
issue of the priority of use of a trademark).
6. See infra Part I.D (summarizing the two Federal Circuit cases issued in 2002
that examined the issue of trademarks for descriptions of goods and services).
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choice of law and timeliness of appeal. Of the eight trademark cases
that reached the Federal Circuit from the Trademark Trial and
9
Appeal Board (“the Board”) in 2002, the Federal Circuit reversed the
10
11
Board three times, affirmed the Board on four occasions, and
12
Addressing appeals from
dismissed the appeal in another.
trademark decisions of lower federal courts in 2002, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the lower court holding on the trademark claims in
13
14
one case, reversed in one case, and affirmed in part and reversed
15
in part in another.

7. See infra Part II.A (discussing the 2002 Federal Circuit decision that
concerned the determination of whether state or federal law applies to a particular
trademark infringement suit).
8. See infra Part II.B (summarizing the Federal Circuit decision delivered in
2002 that addressed the timeliness of a notice of appeal).
9. The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review appeals from the Board
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (2000).
10. See Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reversing the Board’s holding that Kappa’s prior use
created proprietary rights); Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reversing the Board’s conclusion that there
was no likelihood of confusion between the marks in this suit); Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(reversing the Board’s conclusion that the parties’ marks were not sufficiently related
to support a finding of likelihood of confusion).
11. See Galbreath, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9702, at *1 (affirming the Board’s refusal
to register a trademark because it was merely descriptive of the product); PC Club,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4982, at *1 (affirming the Board’s conclusion that there was
little likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue in this action); Royal
Appliance Mfg. Co. v. Minuteman Int’l, Inc., No. 01-1555, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
4381, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 2002) (affirming the Board’s denial to issue a
trademark for domestic and industrial vacuum cleaners based on likelihood of
confusion); Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1422 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming the Board’s refusal to register Valu’s designs
because they were de jure functional).
12. See Boyle v. Barclays Global Investors, N.A., No. 02-1357, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24098, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2002) (dismissing Boyle’s appeal for failure to
file a timely notice of appeal).
13. See Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant on the trademark claims because Transclean failed
to present a relevant genuine issue of material fact).
14. See Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (reversing the district court and remanding for a determination of
the proper choice of law).
15. See Thompson v. Haynes, 305 F.3d 1369, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s finding of likelihood of confusion, but
reversing the lower court’s treatment of damages).
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SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Likelihood of Confusion

In March 2002 alone, the Federal Circuit issued three opinions,
only one of which was published, addressing the likelihood of
16
confusion posed by the marks at issue. The court turned to the
17
18
issue twice more during the year, in June and September.
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc.
The first of the March 2002 trilogy of likelihood of confusion cases
19
featured the return of Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., a
20
dispute that previously reached the Federal Circuit in 2000. This
case arose in connection with Hewlett-Packard Company’s (“HP”)
opposition to Packard Press, Inc.’s (“Packard Press”) application to
register, on an intent-to-use basis, the mark PACKARD
TECHNOLOGIES “for data and information processing, electronic
transmission of data and documents via computer terminals, and
21
electronic transmission of messages and data.” Packard Press also
sought registration of the mark for “data and digital information
(media duplication of) and conversion from one media form to
22
another media (document data transfer and physical).”
Packard Press is a commercial printer specializing in the legal,
23
municipal, and financial industry market. Prior to filing the intentto-use application at issue, Packard Press obtained federal trademark
registrations of two similar marks for use in connection with printing
24
services.
HP owns multiple federal trademark registrations for the marks
HEWLETT PACKARD for use in connection with such goods as
“computers, data processing and data storage systems, data
acquisition systems, printers and printer accessories, facsimile
machines, computer software, and publications regarding data
1.

16. See Galbreath, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9702, at *1; PC Club, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4982, at *1; Royal Appliance, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4381, at *1; Valu Eng’g, 278
F.3d at 1268, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422.
17. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
18. Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
19. 281 F.3d 1261, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
20. Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
21. Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1264, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
22. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002 (internal quotations omitted).
23. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
24. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
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25

processing products.”
HP’s registrations also cover services
including “consulting services for data processing products, rental
and leasing services for data processing equipment, maintenance and
repair of data processing equipment, and retail mail and telephone
26
order services for data processing products.” HP filed an opposition
to the registration of the PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES mark on the
ground that the applied-for mark was confusingly similar to thirteen
27
of HP’s previously registered HEWLETT PACKARD marks.
Initially, the Board sustained HP’s opposition, finding that the
PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES mark created a likelihood of confusion
28
with HP’s marks. However, on September 25, 2000, the Federal
Circuit vacated and remanded the Board’s decision, holding that the
Board incorrectly dissected the marks at issue and failed to clarify, in
the record, whether it applied a proper legal test to assess the
29
relatedness of the parties’ respective goods and services.
On
remand, the Board found no likelihood of confusion between the
PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES mark and the HEWLETT PACKARD
30
marks, and dismissed HP’s opposition.
The Federal Circuit, on
March 1, 2002, reversed the Board’s subsequent determination that
31
there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks.
To assess whether an applied-for mark is likely to cause confusion
with a previously registered mark, the Federal Circuit considers a
series of factors, usually referred to as the “DuPont” factors, that were
32
set forth in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. The Federal Circuit’s
analysis of Packard Press’s PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES mark

25. Id. at 1263-64, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
26. Id. at 1264, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
27. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
28. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
29. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
30. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
31. Id. at 1268, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
32. 476 F.2d 1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The thirteen
DuPont factors are: (1) the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties
as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; (2) the similarity
or dissimilarity and nature of the goods described in the application or registration
of the mark, or in connection with which a prior mark is in use; (3) the similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels; (4) the conditions
under which and the buyers to whom sales are made; (5) the fame of the prior mark;
(6) the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods; (7) the nature
and extent of any actual confusion; (8) the length of time during and the conditions
under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion;
(9) the variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used; (10) the market interface
between applicant and the owner of a prior mark; (11) the extent to which applicant
has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods; (12) the extent of
potential confusion; and (13) any other established fact probative of the effect of
use. Id. at 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 567.
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focussed on two of these factors; namely, the similarity or dissimilarity
of the marks in their entireties, and the similarities or dissimilarities
and nature of the goods or services as described in the parties’
33
application and registrations.
Addressing the DuPont factors, the court indicated that “the
‘similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties’ is a
34
predominant inquiry.”
Answering this inquiry, the court agreed
with the Board’s finding that the similarities in the marks at issue
35
outweighed the differences. In reaching this conclusion, the court
noted that although some differences existed in the appearance and
pronunciation of the marks, “the marks convey a similar commercial
36
impression.”
The court noted the obvious differences between the marks at
issue. Specifically, in HP’s mark, the term “Packard” is “the second
word in a mark consisting of two separate words” while in Packard
37
Press’s mark it is “the first word.” Also, the word “Hewlett,” which is
the first word in HP’s mark, does not appear in Packard Press’s
38
Lastly, the word “Technologies” does not appear in HP’s
mark.
39
mark. Notwithstanding those differences, the court agreed with the
Board’s conclusion that “the dominant portion of Packard Press’s
mark is identical to a prominent portion of HP’s HEWLETT
40
PACKARD marks.” Moreover, the court found that the similarities
of the marks were enhanced by HP’s significant involvement in
technology, increasing the likelihood that “consumers familiar with
the HEWLETT PACKARD marks and HP’s technology-based goods
and services would . . . associate the PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES
41
mark in some way with HP.”
Turning to the second DuPont factor at issue, the similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the parties’ goods and services, the court
disagreed with the Board’s conclusion that the goods and services at
issue were not related enough to support a finding of likelihood of
42
confusion.
The Board based its conclusion on HP’s failure to
present evidence of relatedness beyond the descriptions appearing in
33. Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1265-68, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003-05.
34. Id. at 1265, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361,
177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567).
35. Id. at 1266-67, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003-04.
36. Id. at 1266, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
37. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
38. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003-04.
39. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
40. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
41. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
42. Id. at 1267-68, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004-05.

FINALTRADEMARKSUMMARY.DOC

2003]

8/15/2003 1:44 PM

2002 TRADEMARK DECISIONS

1005

43

the relevant application and registrations.
However, the Federal
Circuit took issue with the Board’s determination that HP needed to
provide further evidence of relatedness, holding that the Board
“erred when it declined to compare the services described in Packard
Press’s application with the goods and services described in HP’s
44
registration.”
Rather, the court observed that HP’s registrations included goods
and services that related closely to the services broadly described in
Packard Press’s application for the PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES
45
mark. Based on that evidence, the court concluded that “consumers
may well find the goods and services of the parties related enough to
make confusion likely,” and thus “[s]ubstantial evidence does not
support the Board’s finding that the goods and services are not
sufficiently related to maintain a finding of a likelihood of
46
confusion.”
Having previously noted that “[t]he likelihood of confusion
analysis considers all DuPont factors for which there is evidence of
record but ‘may focus . . . on dispositive factors such as similarity of
47
the marks and relatedness of the goods,’” the Federal Circuit held
that “[a]s a matter of law, there is a likelihood of confusion between
48
the marks.”
2. Royal Appliance Manufacturing Co. v. Minuteman International,
Inc.
Just six days after publishing its opinion in Hewlett-Packard, the
Federal Circuit issued an unpublished decision addressing the issue
of likelihood of confusion in Royal Appliance Manufacturing Co. v.
49
Minuteman International, Inc. In this case, the court affirmed the
Board’s decision to sustain an opposition based on a finding of
50
likelihood of confusion.
In Royal Appliance, the Federal Circuit addressed the same two
DuPont factors that were addressed in Hewlett-Packard, as well as a
third DuPont factor, the “similarity or dissimilarity of established,
43. Id. at 1267, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
44. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
45. Id. at 1268, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
46. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
47. Id. at 1265, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (quoting Han Beauty, Inc. v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1557, 1559 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
48. Id. at 1268, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
49. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co. v. Minuteman Int’l, Inc., No. 01-1555, 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4381, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 2002).
50. Id. at *1.
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51

likely to continue, trade channels.” At issue was an intent-to-use
application filed in November 1994 by Royal Appliance
Manufacturing Company (“Royal”), seeking to register the mark MVP
for use in connection with “electrical vacuum cleaners for both
52
domestic and industrial use.”
Minuteman International Inc. (“Minuteman”) is a manufacturer of
commercial and industrial vacuum cleaners, which have been
53
marketed under the mark MPV since October 1994. On November
21, 1995, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
54
issued a registration for the MPV mark to Minuteman. Following
publication of Royal’s application, Minuteman filed an opposition
alleging that Royal’s MVP mark was confusingly similar to its own
55
56
MPV mark. The Board sustained Minuteman’s opposition.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Royal argued, inter alia, that the
overall commercial impressions of MPV and MVP are not
substantially similar, that the Board misapplied the factor addressing
similarity or dissimilarity of the goods, and that the channels of trade
57
The
for its products and those of Minuteman do not overlap.
58
Federal Circuit rejected all of Royal’s arguments.
Addressing Royal’s first argument, the court reiterated the
principle that “[a] determination of similarity or dissimilarity under
DuPont requires an examination of the marks in their entirety; the
Board, and [the Federal Circuit], must consider all relevant factors
59
pertaining to the marks’ appearance, sound and connotation.”
Royal had asserted that the letters “MVP” are a common acronym for
“most valuable player” and, thus, in its view, the Board should not
have compared MVP and MPV “as two unpronounceable letter
60
combinations that are inherently difficult to remember.” Rather,
Royal contended, “the Board should have analyzed MVP as a mark
61
Rejecting Royal’s
that evokes an attribute of [Royal’s] goods.”
argument, the court observed that Royal focused solely on the mark’s

51. Id. at *4 (quoting In re E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361,
177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
52. Id. at *1 (internal quotations omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. (sustaining the opposition because of the likelihood of confusion
between the opposing marks).
57. Id. at *3-5.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *3.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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connotation, but ignored the obvious similarities between the marks’
62
appearance and sound.
Royal’s challenge to the Board’s application of the DuPont factor
addressing similarity or dissimilarity of the goods was based on the
Board’s refusal to permit Royal to modify its description of goods in
63
the application at issue. More than a month after Minuteman’s
testimony period in the opposition proceeding had closed, Royal
filed a motion to modify its identification of goods from “‘electrical
vacuum cleaners for both domestic and industrial use’” to “‘electrical
64
vacuum cleaners for domestic use.’”
The Board denied Royal’s
65
Subsequently, the Federal Circuit rejected Royal’s
motion.
challenge to that denial, declaring that “[t]he Board’s decision to
66
deny [Royal’s] motion is not reviewable by the court.” Because the
“law is clear that, in determining likelihood of confusion, the Board
must look to the description of the goods contained in the opposer’s
registration and the applicant’s application rather than to the goods’
67
actual use,” once the Board’s refusal to amend Royal’s description of
goods was sustained, the court easily sustained the Board’s finding
68
that the parties’ goods overlapped.
The court similarly rejected Royal’s challenge to the Board’s
69
analysis of the parties’ channels of trade. As was true with respect to
the analysis of the previous DuPont factor, the contents of the parties’
respective application and registration was significant to the analysis
of the channels of trade. The court noted that, “[i]t is well settled
that absent restrictions in the application and registration, goods and
services are presumed to travel in all appropriate trade channels to all
70
potential purchasers of such goods.”
The court affirmed the
Board’s finding that the channels of trade for the parties’ goods
overlapped because janitorial supply stores sold both domestic and
62. See id. (noting that “the two marks consist of the same three letters, and they
both begin with an ‘M.’ Moreover, the last two letters in Royals’s mark, ‘VP,’ are a
transposition of the remaining letters in Minuteman’s ‘PV,’ and the marks sound
alike when said aloud.”).
63. Id. at *4.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The court stated that “the question of whether the board abused its
discretion in denying such a motion, filed after the testimony period, is a matter to
be determined by the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, not by this court.”
Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. (recognizing that the identification of goods and services will be
determinative of the question of registrability of the mark, regardless of revelations
in the record).
69. Id. at *5.
70. Id. at *5 n.1.
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71

commercial vacuum cleaners. Thus, having rejected all of Royal’s
arguments, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding of a
likelihood of confusion.
PC Club v. Primex Technologies, Inc.
The Federal Circuit issued another unpublished decision
addressing the likelihood of confusion on March 22, 2002 in PC Club
72
v. Primex Technologies, Inc. At issue in PC Club were two applications
made by Primex Technologies, Inc. (“Primex”) to register the marks
EMPOWER, and EMPOWER and design, for use in connection with
“electrical power supplies to provide an in-seat power supply in
transportation vehicles, namely, aircraft, automobiles, boats, buses,
73
trains and vans.” Essentially, Primex’s product supplies a source of
74
power for airline passengers’ laptop computers.
PC Club is a manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer of computers,
computer parts, and peripherals that PC Club marketed under the
75
trademark ENPOWER. PC Club’s ENPOWER mark is registered for
use in connection with computers and various computer
76
peripherals. Based on that registration, PC Club filed oppositions to
each of Primex’s applications on the ground that Primex’s
EMPOWER mark created a likelihood of confusion with PC Club’s
77
ENPOWER mark.
The Board dismissed PC Club’s opposition,
finding that any likelihood of confusion between the parties’ marks
78
was de minimis.
In affirming the Board’s decision, the Federal Circuit addressed
three of the DuPont factors: the relatedness of the parties’ goods, the
channels of trade, and the conditions under which and to whom sales
79
are made.
Addressing the relatedness of the parties’ goods, the
court instructed that “the question that must be considered is
whether the goods are so related that they are likely to be connected
80
in the mind of a prospective purchaser.” The Board concluded, and
the Federal Circuit agreed, that the parties’ products were not
3.

71. Id. at *5.
72. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4982, at *1.
73. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. (quoting In re E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
80. Id. at *2.
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81

competitive with each other.
The court adopted the Board’s
conclusion that “PC Club and Primex sell very different products
under their respective marks. Primex sells a system that provides
airlines passengers a source of power for their laptop computers. PC
Club, on the other hand, sells computers, computer parts and
82
While it seems less than clear, based on this
peripherals.”
explanation provided by the court, that no relationship exists
83
between the parties’ goods, the court concluded that “substantial
84
evidence supports the Board’s decision on this issue.”
Next, the court examined the channels of trade for the parties’
products. The Board determined that “there was a dissimilarity in
the channels of trade because PC Club sells its products at wholesale
or retail to average consumers, whereas Primex’s system is not the
85
type of item that would be sold at retail.” The court agreed that
“there is not more than a theoretical possibility that Primex’s goods
86
would be purchased by general consumers at retail.”
The last DuPont factor considered by the court in PC Club was the
factor encompassing the conditions under which and buyers to whom
sales are made. The court explained that the risk of likelihood of
confusion increases when products are inexpensive and the
87
consumer uses less care in his/her purchase. In this case, the court
found that, “[g]iven the amount of money it costs to install Primex’s
EMPOWER system, it is clear that a purchaser of Primex’s system will
exercise, at a minimum, some degree of care,” and “[t]his is also true
88
of PC Club’s product.” Thus, this factor militated against a finding
of a likelihood of confusion. Viewing all of the issues before it, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal of PC Club’s
89
oppositions.
Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products, Inc.
The Federal Circuit returned to the issue of likelihood of
90
confusion on June 14, 2002, in Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products, Inc.

4.

81. Id. at *3.
82. Id. (internal citations omitted).
83. For example, it does not seem far-fetched that the trademark of a
manufacturer of computers and peripherals would appear in connection with a
power source designed specifically to power those devices.
84. PC Club, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4982, at *1.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at *4.
89. Id.
90. 293 F.3d 1367, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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This case, in which the court discussed four of the DuPont factors,
resulted in the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the Board’s decision to
92
dismiss an opposition to an application for a trademark registration.
At issue in Bose was an application filed by QSC Audio Products,
Inc. (“QSC”) to register the mark POWERWAVE for use in
connection with “[e]lectronic audio and video signal processing
93
equipment, namely, amplifiers and power amplifiers.” Bose
Corporation (“Bose”), which owned the marks ACOUSTIC WAVE
94
and WAVE, opposed that application. Bose’s ACOUSTIC WAVE
mark was registered for use in connection with “loudspeaker systems
and music systems consisting of a loudspeaker system and amplifier
and at least one of a radio tuner, compact disc player and audio tape
95
cassette player.” The Bose WAVE mark was registered “for goods
including radios, clock radios, audio tape recorders and players,
portable radio and cassette recorder combinations, compact stereo
96
systems and portable compact disc players.”
The Board dismissed Bose’s opposition, finding that there was no
97
likelihood of confusion between the parties’ marks. Although it
found commonality between the channels of trade for the parties’
products, the Board concluded that Bose’s marks were not famous,
the parties’ goods were not sufficiently related, and the marks
98
themselves were distinctly dissimilar.
Addressing the Board’s
decision on appeal, the court indicated that if fame of a mark exists,
“it plays a dominant role in the process of balancing the DuPont
99
factors.”
The court concluded that the Bose marks ACOUSTIC
100
WAVE and WAVE deserved protection because they are famous.
Before reaching that conclusion, however, the court engaged in a
lengthy and informative discussion of this fame factor.
First, the court considered the evidence presented by Bose to
demonstrate the fame of its marks. Bose sought to prove the fame of
91. The four factors discussed in Bose are: (i) fame of the opposer’s mark or
marks; (ii) similarity or relatedness of the goods; (iii) commonality of the channels of
trade; and (iv) comparison of the marks. Id. at 1370, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305
(quoting In re E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
92. Id. at 1378, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311-12.
93. Id. at 1369, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (internal quotations omitted).
94. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
95. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (internal quotations omitted).
96. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
97. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305.
98. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305.
99. Id. at 1371, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1305 (quoting Recot Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d
1322, 1327, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1894, 1894 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
100. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309.
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its marks by presenting evidence of sales volume and cost of
101
advertising for its products. Although the volume demonstrated by
102
Bose appeared to be substantial, the Board had “discounted the
sales and advertising evidence for the product marks, standing alone,
because those indicia of fame had not been placed in any context
‘from which to determine how substantial the figures are for these
103
types of products.’”
Considering the issue, the court examined its own past decisions
and instructed that:
Direct evidence of fame, for example from widespread consumer
polls, rarely appears in contests over likelihood of confusion.
Instead, our cases teach that the fame of a mark may be measured
indirectly, among other things, by the volume of sales and
advertising expenditures of the goods traveling under the mark
and by the length of time those indicia of commercial awareness
have been evident. . . . [W]e have consistently accepted statistics of
sales and advertising as indicia of fame: when the numbers are
large, we have tended to accept them without any further
104
supporting proof.

Given its existing precedents on the issue, the court was unwilling to
uphold the Board’s conclusion that Bose’s marks lacked the requisite
fame simply because “Bose had not introduced any direct evidence of
105
consumer recognition of the fame of the marks.”
Although the Federal Circuit rejected the Board’s conclusion in
this case, the court seemed sympathetic to the Board’s analysis, giving
the impression that perhaps mere sales and advertising figures, which
for so long have been relied upon to demonstrate fame, might not be
106
For example, the court indicated with
sufficient in the future.
respect to consumer surveys that “such direct evidence of consumer
awareness of products and the marks they bear is preferable to
indirect evidence of consumer recognition, from which inferences
107
necessarily have to be drawn.” Similarly, the court observed that:
[r]aw numbers of product sales and advertising expenses may have
sufficed in the past to prove fame of a mark, but raw numbers in
101. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306.
102. See id. at 1372-73, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306 (highlighting the seventeen
years of use on the products covered by the mark, with “annual sales of over $50
million . . . [and] more than $5 million annually to advertise” for ACOUSTIC WAVE;
and the “current annual sales of $100 million . . . [with] [c]urrent annual advertising
expenses over $30 million” for WAVE).
103. Id. at 1374, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308.
104. Id. at 1371, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305.
105. Id. at 1373, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308.
106. Id. at 1375, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309.
107. Id. at 1374-75, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308-09.
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today’s world may be misleading. For example, a 30-second spot
commercial shown during a Super Bowl football game may cost a
vast sum, but the expenditure may have little if any impact on how
108
the public reacts to the commercial message.

Thus, the court clearly has signaled that presentation of raw sales and
advertising figures, which were sufficient to demonstrate the fame of
Bose’s marks in this case, may not be enough to prevail in a different
context.
Second, the court analyzed whether the marks at issue possessed
fame distinct from the famous BOSE house mark with which
ACOUSTIC WAVE and WAVE frequently are coupled. Earlier, the
Board concluded that “[a]bsent additional evidence regarding the
nature and extent of promotion or consumer perception of the
marks WAVE and ACOUSTIC WAVE apart from the admittedly
famous BOSE mark, we cannot conclude that this evidence
109
establishes the fame of these pleaded marks.”
Once again, the
Federal Circuit disagreed with but was sympathetic to the Board’s
finding. Noting that “the issue of fame for product marks that travel
110
with famous house marks is new to this court,” the court did not
“fault the Board for its insistence that Bose produce evidence that the
product marks can properly be seen as independent of the famous
111
house marks.”
The court found “overwhelming evidence of the
112
independent trademark significance of the product marks” in the
form of advertising and sales literature and third-party reviews of the
products which “decouple[s] the product marks from the famous
113
house marks.”
Accordingly, the court held that the fame of the
product marks stand apart from Bose’s house marks, and therefore
114
should be afforded protection.
Turning to another DuPont factor, the court found that the Board
erred by concluding that the parties’ goods were unrelated. The
Board had concluded that QSC’s application “identified component
parts, ‘amplifiers and power amplifiers,’ while the Bose . . . marks are
115
Agreeing with the
registered and used for stand-alone systems.”
Board that the products were not identical, the court held, however,
116
that a “conclusion of relatedness is inescapable.” Bose’s registration
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 1375, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309.
Id. at 1374, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308 (internal quotes omitted).
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308.
Id. at 1375, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308-09.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309.
Id. at 1376, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309.
Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
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describes its product “as including an amplifier,” and “consumers
who purchase the Bose product cannot ignore the fact that it, like the
117
QSC product, amplifies via an amplifier.” Thus, in contrast to the
Board, the court determined that the factor of relatedness weighed in
favor of a likelihood of confusion.
The court also disagreed with the Board’s analysis of the similarity
or dissimilarity of the marks. The Board believed that the term
POWER in QSC’s mark POWERWAVE “leads to a different
connotation, as well as a different appearance, than either of
118
opposer’s marks.”
But, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he
presence of the root element WAVE . . . introduces a strong similarity
119
Moreover, the court found that “[w]hatever
in all three marks.”
additional distinction may be introduced by the element POWER . . .
is severely limited by the fact that the mark is applied to acoustic
120
equipment.” Based on these rulings, the court reversed the Board’s
121
decision and denied QSC’s registration of the POWERWAVE mark.
Thompson v. Haynes
The Federal Circuit returned to the issue of confusion one more
time on September 30, 2002, albeit in a different context. In
122
Thompson v. Haynes, the court reviewed a decision of U.S. District
123
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma involving claims
124
125
under the Lanham Act, among other things.
5.

117. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
118. Id. at 1377-78, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
119. Id. at 1378, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
120. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
121. The court also addressed the DuPont factor relating to the similarity of trade
channels. Id. at 1377, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. The court agreed with the
Board’s ruling that this factor leaned in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion
based upon the lack of language limiting channels of trade in QSC’s application. Id.,
63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
122. 305 F.3d 1369, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
123. The Federal Circuit enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of decisions
involving claims arising under the federal patent laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)
(1982). In cases involving both patent and non-patent claims, appeals relating to the
non-patent issues may also fall within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Bandag, Inc. v. Al Boser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 909, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (prohibiting the false or misleading
representation of a fact that is likely to cause confusion with respect tot the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of any goods or services).
125. The case initially was brought by Thompson seeking a declaration of patent
non-infringement, and recovery of unpaid royalties. Thompson, 305 F.3d at 1372, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. Fluid Controls responded with counterclaims under the
patent laws, as well as for violations of the Lanham Act. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1652.
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Thompson involved the sale of “fluid conducting swivel devices” that
were manufactured and distributed under a patent royalty agreement
between Earl E. Thompson, Fluid Controls, Inc. (“Fluid Controls”),
126
and Fluid Controls’ president Henry T. Haynes. At first, Thompson
127
acted as the distributor of swivels manufactured by Fluid Controls.
Following disputes between the parties concerning royalties,
128
Thompson began to produce and sell his own swivels.
Before selling his own swivels, Thompson applied the designation
129
“SW-343” on Fluid Controls’ swivels that he distributed.
Subsequently, upon receiving an order for swivels from a prior Fluid
Controls customer, Thompson supplied his own swivels, which bore
130
the designation “SW-343-D.”
When Thompson’s customer then
had trouble installing Thompson’s swivels, the customer contacted
131
Fluid Controls for assistance.
Fluid Controls claimed that Thompson’s actions amounted to a
132
violation of Section 43 of the Lanham Act.
Finding that
Thompson’s substitution of swivels created a likelihood of confusion,
the district court found that Thompson’s acts “constituted a false
designation of origin, a false or misleading description of fact, and a
false or misleading misrepresentation of fact in violation of Section
133
43 of the Lanham Act.”
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding with
134
respect to Lanham Act liability.
To do so, the Federal Circuit
135
To determine whether a likelihood of
applied Tenth Circuit law.
confusion exists, the Tenth Circuit, like the Federal Circuit, applies a
136
series of factors. Except for the factor relating to the degree of care
126. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
127. Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
128. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
129. Id. at 1376, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
130. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
131. Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
132. Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
133. Id. at 1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656 (internal quotations omitted).
134. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the
district court’s treatment of damages.
135. When reviewing patent issues, the Federal Circuit applies its own law, “but
with respect to nonpatent issues [it] generally appl[ies] the law of the circuit in
which the district court sits.” Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d
1356, 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
136. The factors considered in the Tenth Circuit to analyze the existence of a
likelihood of confusion are: (i) the degree of similarity between the marks; (ii) the
strength or weakness of the plaintiff’s mark; (iii) the intent of the alleged infringer in
adopting its mark; (iv) the similarities and differences of the parties’ goods, services
and marketing strategies; (v) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers
of the goods or services involved; and (vi) evidence of actual confusion, if any.
Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 554, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481,
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exercised by consumers, the district court found, and the Federal
Circuit agreed, that the “factors all support a finding of likelihood of
137
confusion.”
The court deemed Fluid Controls’ evidence of actual confusion
particularly important to the establishment of a likelihood of
138
confusion.
Fluid Controls’ evidence established that “a
representative of the consumer of the swivels, made an ‘incorrect
139
mental association between the involved . . . producers’” when he
140
contacted Fluid Controls about swivels made by Thompson.
While it affirmed the district court’s finding that a likelihood of
confusion existed and thus a violation of the Lanham Act occurred,
the Federal Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s treatment of
141
damages.
The trial court added Thompson’s profits, Fluid
Controls’ lost sales, and Fluid Controls’ costs to run corrective
142
advertising, and awarded three times the sum to Fluid Controls.
The Federal Circuit held that such an award is not authorized by 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a), which sets out damage provisions for violations of
143
the Lanham Act.
The Federal Circuit explained that the statute requires that
144
damages and profits be treated as separate issues.
Courts are
permitted to award treble damages, but are disallowed from awarding
145
three times the proven profit amount. Rather, in terms of profits,
“the court is constrained to award the amount proved, subject only to
an adjustment, up or down, where the recovery would be otherwise
146
unjust.” Although it could be argued that the trebling of profits by
the district court was such a permissible adjustment, the Federal
Circuit made clear that “[t]he court may not, as it did here, simply
lump profits together with damages and apply the same measure of
147
enhancement to both.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed
148
and remanded for further consideration the damage award.
1483 (10th Cir. 1998).
137. Thompson, 305 F.3d at 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
138. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
139. Id. at 1376, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
140. See id. at 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655 (stating that after Fluid Controls
presented this evidence, Thompson bore the burden of rebutting this demonstration
of actual confusion).
141. Id. at 1378, 1380, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656-57.
142. Id. at 1380, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
143. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
144. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
145. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
146. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
147. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
148. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
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B. Functionality: Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp.
149

In Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., the Federal Circuit
150
addressed the issue of functionality.
Generally, the law has long
provided that product designs that are functional cannot serve as
trademarks. As the Supreme Court has explained:
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to
promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from
instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to
control a useful product feature. It is the province of patent law,
not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a
monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited
151
time.

Thus, the Federal Circuit’s predecessor established a series of factors,
the “Morton-Norwich factors,” to assess whether a particular product
152
feature is functional, and hence unable to serve as a mark.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has addressed the issue of
functionality, most recently in the 2001 case TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
153
Marketing Displays, Inc.
Valu Engineering presented the Federal
Circuit with an opportunity to rule on whether the Supreme Court’s
recent holding in TrafFix changed the Morton-Norwich factors for
154
determining functionality. The case also presented an issue of first
impression, for both the Board and the Federal Circuit, relating to
whether the analysis of functionality properly may focus on a single
narrow use for the design at issue, as opposed to the full range of uses
155
that may be made of that design.
Valu Engineering, Inc. (“Valu”), a producer of conveyors, filed
three applications in 1993 seeking to register as trademarks “conveyer
guide rail configurations in ROUND, FLAT and TEE cross-sectional
156
designs.”
Valu’s application indicated that the applied-for marks
149. 278 F.3d 1268, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
150. Id. at 1273, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
151. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1161, 1163 (1995).
152. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-41, 213 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 9, 15-16 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The Morton-Norwich factors are: (i) the existence
of a utility patent disclosing the design’s utilitarian benefits; (ii) advertising materials
in which the design’s creator promotes the design’s utilitarian benefits; (iii) the
availability to competitors of functionally equivalent designs; and (iv) facts indicating
that the design yields a relatively uncomplicated and low cost way of manufacturing
the product. Id., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 15-16.
153. 532 U.S. 23, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (2001).
154. Valu Eng’g, 278 F.3d at 1274, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
155. Id. at 1277, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
156. Id. at 1271, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423. “Conveyer guide rails are rails
positioned along the length of the sides of a conveyor to keep containers or objects
that are traveling on the conveyor from falling off the conveyor.” Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d
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were used in connection with “Conveyor Guide Rails.”
Rexnord
Corporation (“Rexnord”) filed oppositions to Valu’s applications on
158
The Board
the ground that the subject designs were functional.
159
sustained Rexnord’s opposition.
Before turning to the issue of first impression, the court analyzed
whether the manner in which the Board had applied the Morton160
Norwich factors was rendered inappropriate by TrafFix. Of concern
was the third factor, relating to the availability to competitors of
161
In TrafFix, the Supreme Court
functionally equivalent designs.
found that a dual-spring feature of a traffic sign stand for which a
162
party had sought trade dress protection was functional.
Reaching
this conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected rulings of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that the “appropriate question is
whether the particular product configuration is a competitive
163
necessity,”
and thus “[e]xclusive use of a feature must ‘put
competitors at a significant non-reputation related disadvantage’
164
before trade dress protection is denied on functionality grounds.”
Instead, the Supreme Court applied the “traditional” rule that “a
product feature is functional . . . if it is essential to the use or purpose
165
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.” The
Supreme Court also instructed that, once a product is found to be
functional under the traditional rule, “there is no need to proceed
further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the
166
feature,” and, therefore, “no need . . . to engage . . . in speculation
167
about other design possibilities.”
In Valu Engineering, the Federal Circuit considered whether that
pronouncement by the Supreme Court rendered unnecessary the

(BNA) at 1423.
157. Id. at 1271-72, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.
158. Id. at 1271, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.
159. Id. at 1272, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.
160. Id. at 1276, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
161. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
162. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001 (2001).
163. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 940, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1335, 1343 (6th Cir. 1999).
164. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods.
Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (1995)).
165. TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 32, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (quoting Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Inves Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 n.10
(1982) (internal quotations omitted)).
166. Id. at 33, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
167. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
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Morton-Norwich factor addressing availability of equivalent designs.
The Federal Circuit concluded that it did not, explaining that:
Nothing in TrafFix suggests that consideration of alternative
designs is not properly part of the overall mix, and we do not read
the Court’s observations in TrafFix as rendering the availability of
alternative designs irrelevant. Rather, we conclude that the Court
merely noted that once a product feature is found functional based
on other considerations, there is no need to consider the
availability of alternative designs, because the feature cannot be
given trade dress protection merely because there are alternative
169
designs available.

According to the Federal Circuit, this “does not mean that the
availability of alternative designs cannot be a legitimate source of
evidence to determine whether a feature is functional in the first
170
place.”
Thus, the Federal Circuit stated that it “do[es] not
understand the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix to have altered
171
the Morton-Norwich analysis.”
The Federal Circuit next turned to the main issue in Valu
Engineering of whether the Board incorrectly narrowed its scope to a
172
single application of the designs at issue.
Valu Engineering’s
173
As the
designs were cross-sections of conveyer belt guide rails.
court explained, “the Board focused primarily on the utilitarian
advantages of Valu’s designs in a particular, competitively-significant
application, namely, as they are used in the wet areas of bottling and
174
canning plants.” The Board had limited its analysis to this specific
application instead of taking into account all potential uses for Valu
175
Engineering’s designs.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s approach, and
concluded that “[r]equiring the Board to review the ‘entire universe’
of potential uses of a contested mark in the recited identification of
goods would seriously undermine the goals of the functionality
176
doctrine.” Rather, the court found that when a design is functional
in just “a single competitively significant application,” the design
must be considered functional and may not be protected as a mark
168. Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
169. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
170. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
171. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
172. Id. at 1276-77, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
173. Id. at 1271, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423.
174. Id. at 1277, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
175. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
176. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.

FINALTRADEMARKSUMMARY.DOC

2003]

8/15/2003 1:44 PM

2002 TRADEMARK DECISIONS

1019
177

“even if there is no anticompetitive effect in any other areas of use.”
The rationale for the court’s conclusion was that, irrespective of how
many areas exist in which the design may be utilized in a nonfunctional way, once there is a single significant area in which the
design is functional, protection of the design as a mark would confer
a monopoly over a useful product feature—something that is the
178
province of the patent laws.
Accordingly, the court held that the
Board’s decision to limit its functionality analysis to the wet area of
plants while ignoring all other actual or potential uses of the design
179
was permissible.
C. Priority: Herbko International v. Kappa Books, Inc.
180

In Herbko International v. Kappa Books, Inc. the Federal Circuit
addressed the issue of priority of use of a mark. Generally, the party
that makes first use of a mark in commerce enjoys prior rights over
parties that subsequently adopt the same mark for use with the same
181
or related goods or services.
Herbko presented the court with an
opportunity to consider application of the general rule of priority in
the context of book titles. Herbko involved a cancellation proceeding
in which the Board granted summary judgment canceling Herbko
International, Inc.’s (“Herbko”) registration for the mark
CROSSWORD COMPANION on the basis that Kappa Books, Inc.
182
(“Kappa”) had shown prior use of that mark as a title of a book. On
appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s grant of summary
183
judgment.
Herbko filed an intent-to-use application in June 1994 seeking to
register the mark CROSSWORD COMPANION and design in
connection with a “crossword puzzle system, namely paper crossword
puzzle rolls and hand held puzzle roll scrolling device sold as a unit
184
and crossword puzzle replacement rolls sold separately.” Herbko’s
application subsequently ripened into a registration based upon a
declaration of September 22, 1994 as the date of first use in

177. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
178. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
179. Id. at 1279, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429.
180. 308 F.3d 1156, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
181. See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (stating that “[t]he
trademark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something already in existence
as the distinctive symbol of the party using it . . . [i]t is simply founded on priority of
appropriation.”).
182. Herbko Int’l, 308 F.3d at 1159-60, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
183. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381.
184. Id. at 1160, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
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commerce.
In June 1997, Kappa filed a petition seeking the
cancellation of Herbko’s registration on the grounds that Kappa had
made prior use of the CROSSWORD COMPANION mark, and
186
Herbko’s subsequent use was likely to cause confusion. The Board
found no questions of fact concerning either priority of use or the
187
likelihood of confusion, and granted summary judgment to Kappa.
The basis for the Board’s decision was that, in 1993, Kappa sold over
one million copies of a crossword puzzle book under the name
188
CROSSWORD COMPANION.
Kappa published a second volume
of the book in 1995, and sold over 900,000 CROSSWORD
189
COMPANION books from 1995 to 1997.
However, Kappa made
190
“no significant sales” of the books in 1994.
To establish priority, a party “must show proprietary rights in the
191
mark that produce a likelihood of confusion.”
As the Federal
Circuit explained, “[t]hese proprietary rights may arise from a prior
registration, prior trademark or service mark use, prior use as a trade
name, prior use analogous to trademark or service mark use, or any
192
other use sufficient to establish proprietary rights.”
Rejecting the
Board’s decision in Herbko, the court determined that Kappa’s prior
use of the CROSSWORD COMPANION title did not amount to any
use from which proprietary rights may arise.
Rather, as stated by the court, “[b]efore a prior use becomes an
analogous use sufficient to create proprietary rights, the petitioner
must show prior use sufficient to create an association in the minds of the
193
purchasing public between the mark and the petitioner’s goods.”
The court interpreted its own precedent in declaring that “the
publication of a single book cannot create, as a matter of law, an
association between the book’s title (the alleged mark) and the
194
source of the book (the publisher).” The combination of these two
principles compelled the court to find that Kappa’s use of the
CROSSWORD COMPANION title in 1993 did not establish priority
over Herbko’s 1994 intent-to-use application.
In overturning the Board’s decision, the court rejected the Board’s
finding that when Kappa produced its second CROSSWORD
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
Id. at 1160-61, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
Id. at 1160, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
Id. at 1162, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1163, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378 (emphasis added).
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COMPANION book in 1995, it “perfected” the use that had begun
195
Instead, the court
with publication of the first volume in 1993.
explained that:
If a later party uses or applies for a trademark before the creation
of a series (i.e., before the publication of a second volume), the
proprietary rights for the series title date back to the first volume of
the series only if the second volume is published within a
reasonable time with a requisite association in the public mind.
196
That association requires more than publication of a single book.

Since Kappa failed to prove publication of a second volume prior to
Herbko’s 1994 intent-to-use application, the court determined that
the Board erred in its conclusion that Kappa possessed priority to the
197
mark. Accordingly, the court reversed the cancellation of Herbko’s
mark.
D. Descriptiveness
In May 2002, the Federal Circuit twice examined the issue of
198
descriptiveness. Generally, a mark is not entitled to protection and
may not be registered if the mark “is merely descriptive” of the goods
or services in connection with which it is used unless it can be shown
199
that the mark has developed secondary meaning.
195. Id. at 1162, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
196. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378-79 (emphasis added).
197. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379. The court also reviewed and agreed with
the Board’s determination that “Herbko’s CROSSWORD COMPANION mark is
sufficiently similar to Kappa’s mark, when applied to the goods at issue, that
purchasers would likely believe those goods were associated with a single source.” Id.
at 1166, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381. The court’s ruling with respect to priority,
however, compelled reversal of the grant of summary judgment for Kappa. Id., 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381.
198. In re Galbreath, No. 01-1620, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9702 (Fed. Cir. May 9,
2002); Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 209 F.3d 1364, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2000). The statute provides:
[n]o trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished
from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal
register on account of its nature unless it: [c]onsists of a mark which
(1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is
merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, (2) when used on
or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically
descriptive of them, except as indications of regional origin may be
registrable under section 1054 of this title, (3) when used on or in
connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive of them, (4) is primarily merely a surname, or
(5) comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional.
Id. See also In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1341, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1564, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that “[a] merely descriptive mark qualifies
for registration only if the applicant shows that it has acquired secondary
meaning.”) (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769
(1992)).
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In re Galbreath
The Federal Circuit first addressed descriptiveness in In re
200
Galbreath, an unpublished decision issued on May 9, 2002.
In
Galbreath, the court affirmed the Board’s refusal to register the mark
SAFE-T-BUCKLE applied for by John A. Galbreath (“Galbreath”) for
use in connection with “plastic buckle fasteners for use in child
strollers, high chairs, child carriers, changing stations, shopping cart
201
restraint systems and similar articles.”
The Board found
202
Galbreath’s mark merely descriptive of his products.
The Federal Circuit agreed, indicating that “[a] mark qualifies for
registration if it ‘requires imagination, thought and perception to
203
arrive at the qualities or characteristics of the goods.’” In contrast,
the court found that Galbreath’s mark “immediately describes a safety
204
buckle”—the relevant goods.
The court was not swayed by Galbreath’s identification of other
marks with the prefix “Safe-T” that had been approved and
registered, such as “Safe-T-Belt” for back braces and “Safe-T-Strap” for
205
support lines for construction workers. Rather, the court instructed
that “[t]he Patent and Trademark Office must decide each case on its
own merits; and third party registrations of other marks using the
206
same terms do not conclusively rebut a finding of descriptiveness.”
Distinguishing the third-party marks identified by Galbreath, the
court found that those marks “do not immediately describe the
relevant goods, but are suggestive and require a mental step to relate
207
the marks to the goods.”
In contrast, the court found that by
consulting the dictionary definitions of “safety” and “buckle,” it was
clear that Galbreath’s mark “immediately convey[s] to the public that
208
the product is a fastener used for safety purposes.” Accordingly, the
court agreed with the Board’s decision affirming the Patent and
Trademark Office’s refusal to register SAFE-T-BUCKLE.
1.

Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc.
The Federal Circuit briefly turned its attention again to the issue of
descriptiveness on May 21, 2002, when it issued an opinion in
2.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Galbreath, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9702, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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209

Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., an appeal from a decision
210
of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. In
this case, Transclean Corporation (“Transclean”) alleged patent and
trademark infringement claims against Bridgewood Services, Inc.
(“Bridgewood”) arising in connection with Bridgewood’s sales of a
211
device for changing automatic transmission fluid.
Transclean
claimed that Bridgewood infringed Transclean’s unregistered marks
212
TOTAL FLUID EXCHANGE and TOTAL FLUID X CHANGE.
The district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement
against Transclean on the ground that Transclean had not
established protectable rights in the marks, specifically “that there
was no genuine issue of material fact relating to Transclean’s actual
213
usage of the marks in commerce.”
Reviewing the lower court’s
decision, the Federal Circuit agreed that “Transclean failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to nondescriptive usage of the mark
214
on the goods.”
As the court explained, in order to be eligible for
protection, “the usage of the marks must be as a source identifier
215
The record on
rather than a description of the goods’ qualities.”
appeal showed that Transclean’s marks “were used in a purely
descriptive manner, e.g., ‘TFX TOTAL FLUID EXCHANGE SYSTEM
216
FOR AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSIONS by Transclean Corp.’”
Accordingly, because the marks asserted by Transclean were merely
descriptive, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s summary
217
judgment of non-infringement.

209. 290 F.3d 1364, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
210. See Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D.
Minn. 1999) (holding that plaintiff did not hold a protected trademark), aff’d in part
and vacated in part, 290 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
211. Transclean, 290 F.3d at 1369, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
212. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
213. Id. at 1380, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
214. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
215. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
216. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
217. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. In addition, the Federal Circuit affirmed
dismissal of Transclean’s trademark infringement claims on the alternate ground
that Transclean’s marks had not been used in commerce because the marks were not
affixed to Transclean’s goods. Applying Eighth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit
indicated that “[u]se of the mark on documents does not satisfy the usage
requirement when the mark can be affixed to the goods themselves.” Id., 62
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. Transclean had not affixed the marks to its goods. Id.,
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
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II. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Choice of Law: Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, Inc.
218

In Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, Inc., the Federal Circuit determined
which law the district court should have applied to an assertion of
trademark infringement. The United States District Court for the
Central District of California, as well as the parties, “presumed that
Federal Circuit law regarding bad faith governs [the party’s]
219
The Federal Circuit
assertions of trademark infringement.”
disagreed.
Golan involved a dispute between Ilan Golan and Pingel Enterprise,
Inc. (“Pingel”), both of whom manufactured after-market products
220
for motorcycles including a type of fuel valve known as a “petcock.”
In October 1998, after Golan began advertising its petcocks, Pingel’s
attorney sent a cease and desist letter asserting that Golan’s
production and sales of petcocks under the mark PEAK FLOW
infringed various of Pingel’s patents as well as Pingel’s POWER-FLO
221
mark for petcocks. Pingel also sent letters to its own distributors to
“alert” them that Pingel was taking “immediate action to halt the sale
and production” of Golan’s petcock because it “infringes patents and
222
a trademark held by Pingel.” Five months later, Golan brought suit
seeking declarations of non-infringement of the patents and
223
trademark at issue. Golan also asserted antitrust claims and unfair
competition claims based upon Pingel’s communications to
distributors about the alleged infringing nature of Golan’s
224
products.
Pingel counterclaimed for infringement of its POWER225
FLO mark.
The district court resolved all of the parties’ claims—except for the
226
trademark infringement claims—on summary judgment.
The
parties subsequently stipulated to dismissal without prejudice Golan’s
motion for declaratory judgment of non-infringement of Pingel’s
227
trademark, as well as Pingel’s trademark counterclaims.
Nevertheless, issues of trademark law were addressed on appeal in the
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

310 F.3d 1360, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920.
Id. at 1362, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
Id. at 1363-64, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
Id. at 1364, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
Id. at 1365, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913-14.
Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
Id. at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
Id. at 1366 n.3, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 n.3.
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analysis of Golan’s claim for unfair competition based on Pingel’s
statements to distributors. The district court ruled that those
statements were not actionable “because Golan provided insufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption that Pingel made the claims
228
[concerning alleged infringements by Golan] in good faith.”
In reaching that determination, the district court applied Federal
229
Circuit trademark law.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected
application of its own law. Instead, the Federal Circuit reiterated the
well-established rule that “[t]he law of the pertinent regional circuit
230
governs the assertion of federally protected trademark rights.” The
appellate court further explained,
If, however, Pingel had not federally registered the Power-Flo mark
at the time he asserted infringement, the asserted trademark rights
are entirely the creature of state or common law. If that is the case,
no federal statute preempts or affects the remaining state claims.
Rather, Ninth Circuit law applies to the federal Lanham Act claims
predicated on the assertion of state trademark rights, and state law
applies entirely to the California unfair competition and business
231
tort claims predicated on the assertion of state trademark rights.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit “remand[ed] to the district court to
ascertain the proper application of law with respect to the trademark
232
infringement issues.”
B. Timeliness of Appeal: Boyle v. Barclays Global Investors, N.A.
233

In Boyle v. Barclays Global Investors, N.A., an unpublished decision,
the Federal Circuit briefly addressed the timeliness of a notice of
appeal. In this case, John C. Boyle sought to appeal from a decision
of the Board that was issued on November 1, 2001. As the Federal
Circuit explained, “[a]n appeal from a decision of the Board must be
filed with the PTO within two months of the date of the Board’s
decision. In this case, the notice of appeal was due by January 2,
234
2002.”
Although the appellant stated that “he mailed a notice of
appeal to the court on November 30, 2001 and again on January 3,
235
2002,” the “PTO received Boyle’s notice of appeal on January 7,

228. Id. at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
229. Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920.
230. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920 (citing Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174
F.3d 1308, 1326, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
231. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920.
232. Id. at 1374, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920.
233. No. 02-1357, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24098 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2002).
234. Id. at *1.
235. Id.
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236

2002.”
Because the PTO received the notice of appeal more than
two months after the date of the Board’s decision, the Federal Circuit
237
dismissed Boyle’s appeal for being untimely.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s 2002 opinions did not present any sweeping
new interpretations or applications of trademark law. Rather, the
court’s decisions continued to apply, and modestly refine, preexisting
principles. Substantive issues predominated over procedural issues in
trademark cases addressed by the Federal Circuit in 2002. In five
different cases, the Federal Circuit addressed issues relating to
whether a likelihood of confusion was demonstrated.
Other
substantive trademark issues addressed by the Federal Circuit in 2002
included functionality and priority of use. Although the 2002
trademark cases addressed by the Federal Circuit do not represent
any shifts in the law, the cases do provide insight into the Federal
Circuit’s approach to trademark law.

236. Id.
237. Id.

